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The Excess Funds Problem of the Savings Groups in Laos: 
Case Study of a Village in Vientiane Municipality
Fujita Koichi*
There is a tendency that the success of some of the village-level savings groups in 
Laos inevitably causes an excess funds problem, because the activity of a saving 
group is confined to a small village territory.  Given the lack of efficient and reason-
able system for coordinating between funds-surplus and funds-deficit savings groups, 
the excess funds problem of funds-surplus savings groups leads to a stagnation of 
such groups, whereas other funds-deficit groups continue to suffer from the fund 
shortage.  The paper, based on a case study of a village in Vientiane Municipality 
since 2003 until 2012, analyzes how various stakeholders responded to such an 
excess funds problem with an apparent failure in the study village and alerts the 
policy-makers in Laos to make necessary measures, since the excess funds problem 
is also providing a good opportunity to establish a broader and integrated institu-
tional financial system in rural Laos.
Keywords: village-level savings group, excess funds problem, Laos
I Introduction
The Village Savings and Credit Group (hereinafter, SG) in Laos is basically a closed, village- 
level financial group.  Membership is confined to villagers, and savings mobilization and 
credit extension are limited to the members.  Roughly 70% of profits from credit opera-
tions are distributed as dividends once a year to members in proportion to their savings 
amount.  In general, at first, demand for credit exceeds savings and because external insti-
tutions generally provide no, or very little, seed funding, so an SG inevitably rations credit.1) 
Later, as the group develops and savings accumulate to a certain level, savings begin to 
exceed credit demand.  Lowering the interest rate, which is a common adjustment meas-
ure, has an apparent inhibitory effect on the development of SGs as a reduced interest 
* 藤田幸一, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 46 Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida 
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
 e-mail: kfujita@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp
1) The case of the study village’s SG gave priority to members with urgent needs and small loan 
amounts.
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rate discourages savings mobilization, although a substantial savings surplus exists 
among village households.  Such SGs suffer from an excess funds problem.  We also note 
the existence of many SGs that suffer from shortage of funds in a prolonged period.
To avoid such a scenario, SGs require a system to coordinate the gap between 
demand and supply among funds-surplus and funds-deficit SGs.  When SGs as a whole 
have excess funds, the surplus money should be transferred to external financial markets. 
Through such a developmental process, SGs can be integrated into the broader financial 
system, thus contributing to the development of the nation-wide financial markets.  The 
agricultural cooperatives in Japan, for instance, established the three-tier cooperative 
system—village-level, prefecture-level, and nation-level—to transfer excess funds from 
village-level cooperatives to a nation-level cooperative bank (see the first paper in this 
special issue by Ohno) and thereby supported the formation of the country’s more effi-
cient and integrated financial market.
In Laos, some SGs, especially those in Vientiane Municipality, began facing an 
excess funds problem several years after establishment.  The present study examines 
the responses of the various stakeholders—committee members and advisers of an SG, 
villagers, NGOs (Foundation for Integrated Agricultural and Environmental Manage ment 
[FIAM] and Community Organizations Development Institute [CODI]),2) and the Lao 
Women’s Union (LWU)—to this problem.  This study’s major objective is to investigate 
the excess funds problem, focusing on the aforementioned stakeholders’ responses 
through a detailed case study of a village in Pakngum District, Vientiane Municipality. 
By analyzing the process of the development of SG, this study also identifies the SG’s 
impact on the village financial market and economy.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we describe the study village on the 
basis of a household survey of 75 sample households, followed by a discussion of the SG’s 
development and impact on the village economy in section 3.  Section 4 presents the pro-
cess that caused the excess funds problem and the methods by which the SG committee 
and other stakeholders attempted to manage it.  Section 5 presents the conclusions.
II Profile of the Study Village
FIAM and CODI began organizing SGs in Vientiane Municipality (hereinafter, Vientiane) 
in 1997.  By December 2003, a total of 217 SGs were formed in Laos, covering nine 
2) FIAM is a Thai NGO.  CODI is a Thai semi-governmental organization.  The system of governing 
SGs is almost the same for the two institutions.  See Ohno and Arimoto (2005) for SGs under FIAM.
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districts (muang) of which five were in Vientiane (Table 1).  A total of 178 SGs existed 
in Vientiane, concentrating in the Xaythany District (92 villages out of 103) and Pakngum 
District (53 villages out of 53).  Also notable was the amount of savings: as of December 
2003, 217 groups had accumulated 5.89 billion kip (averaging 27.2 million kip per group),3) 
of which 145 groups (roughly two-thirds the groups) in Xaythany and Pakngum Districts 
had accumulated 4.99 billion kip (84.7%).
The study village (ban), Don Neua, is one of the 53 villages in Pakngum District. 
Supported by CODI, an SG was established in September 2000.  Don Neua is located 
along the Mekong River, which forms the border between Laos and Thailand.  From 
central Vientiane city, vehicles must travel roughly 55 km to east along national highway 
no. 13 and roughly 15 km southwest along a dirt road (See Fig. 1 of Chansathith, Ohno, 
Fujita and Mieno, the fifth paper in this special issue).  The village has a long history 
of around 400 years.  In March 2003, when the author conducted the first preliminary 
survey, the village contained 147 households and 752 people.  Lao was the predominant 
ethnic group.4)
3) The exchange rate in 2003 was roughly US$1≒10,000 kip.
4) There was another village, Don Tay (“tay” means south while “neua” means north in Lao language), 
which was separated from Don Neua village during the 1960s, although the two villages’ residential 
area was continuous.  In March 2003, Don Tay had 71 households and 345 people, including some 
migrants from Thailand.
Table 1 The Savings Groups in Laos as of December 2003





























Pakngum 53 53 100.0% 3,871 73 1,194,700 22,542 309 CODI
Naxaythong 56 15 26.8% 1,430 95 194,592 12,973 136 CODI
Xaythany 103 92 89.3% 11,289 123 3,797,347 41,276 336 FIAM
Sangthong 37 14 37.8% 903 65 167,214 11,944 185 FIAM
Xaysetha 52 4 7.7% 499 125 135,333 33,833 271 FIAM
Chanthabuly 37 0 0% 0 – 0 – – –
Sikhottabong 60 0 0% 0 – 0 – – –
Sisuttanak 40 0 0% 0 – 0 – – –
Hadxaifong 60 0 0% 0 – 0 – – –
Total Vientiane Municipality 498 178 35.7% 17,992 101 5,489,186 30,838 305
Thakhek 141 24 17.0% 1,870 78 217,214 9,051 116 FIAM
Hinboon 166 2 1.2% 81 41 31,837 15,919 393 FIAM
Viengkham 18 7 38.9% 597 85 32,291 4,613 54 FIAM
Thoulakhom 74 6 8.1% 755 126 122,598 20,433 162 FIAM
Grand Total 897 217 24.2% 21,295 98 5,893,126 27,157 277
Source: LWU and CODI (undated).
Note: CODI: Community Organizations Development Institute; FIAM: Foundation for Integrated Agricultural 
and Environmental Management
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At the time of the survey in 2003, the economy of Don Neua was mainly based on 
crop cultivation, livestock raising, and brewing of rice alcohol locally called jees.  The 
agricultural land was largely classified into paddy field and garden land, with areas of 
223 ha and 63.4 ha, respectively.  Garden land spread along the bank of the Mekong River, 
where farmers grew banana, mango, tamarind, teak, sugarcane, and other products as 
cash crops.  Roughly 20–30% of the paddy field was irrigated with water pumped from 
the Mekong River,5) where dry season rice was grown besides monsoon season rice.  The 
average rice yield was 3.0 ton/ha and 4.0–4.5 ton/ha for the monsoon and dry seasons, 
respectively.  Tenancy was developed to some extent in the paddy field, especially in the 
dry season.6)
Villagers began brewing jees roughly 20 years before the 2003 survey, and 36 house-
holds (roughly 25%) were engaged in this cottage industry in 2003.  Village statistics 
reported 184 heads of cattle, nine buffaloes, 80 pigs, and roughly 2,000 chickens.  Fisher-
ies were unpopular in the Mekong River, and only a small-scale operation was observed 
for self-consumption.  Many emigrants from the village worked in the USA and regularly 
sent money as remittances.  Roughly one-third of the households received such regular 
support from family/relative members in the USA.  The remittances were sent in cash 
(US dollars) in a letter, instead of utilizing banking networks.
A total of 75 households (51% of the total) were randomly selected for a question-
naire survey in July 2003.  Table 2 shows population characteristics of the sampled 
households, which were categorized by landholding size of paddy field.  Of the 75 house-
holds, 7 (9.3%) were landless non-farm households, which neither owned nor rented 
farmland (including garden land).  The average age of heads of landless non-farm house-
holds was 32.4 years, far less than that of farm households (49.2 years on average).7) 
Among the farm households, it was observed that the larger the farm size, the older the 
household head.
Table 3 shows the distribution of farmland and other basic information for the sam-
5) A pump was installed in the territory of Don Tay in 1984 by ODA from the Netherlands.  Both 
Don Tay and Don Neua villagers used pumped water, covering roughly 227 ha of paddy field.  In 2000, 
villagers established a water users association (WUA), the members of which paid a 150,000 kip/ha 
irrigation fee annually.  The WUA assumed responsibility for managing the pump, including minor 
repairs.  Ten groups of farmers under the WUA were responsible maintaining water channels.  The 
WUA was reluctant to pay electricity charges to the government (for unknown reasons), and unpaid 
dues reached nearly 80 million kip in March 2003.
6) Land rent was paid with a one-third share of production in the rainy season, whereas in the dry season 
tenant farmers paid a fixed amount of paddy (three bags per rai, equivalent to 0.63 ton/ha).
7) The non-farm households were either new immigrants (five households; hereinafter, HHs) or 
households newly separated from parents (two HHs), engaged in wage labor (four HHs), jees brew-
ing (two HHs), goldsmithing (one HH), and shop keeping (one HH).
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pled households.  The majority of farm households (47 out of 67) had less than 2 ha of 
paddy field, whereas 12 farm households owned more than 3 ha.  More than 10% of paddy 
fields were rented out, mainly to land-poor households.  The average land holding size 
of garden land was only 0.5 ha, but it was more equally distributed among the households. 
Twenty-nine percent (29.3%) of households were engaged in jees brewing (including 
yeast making).  One-third of the households regularly received remittances from abroad. 
Table 4 shows that the average number of livestock holding per household was 3.1 cattle, 
3.1 pigs, 10.5 ducks, and 16.8 chickens.  Interestingly, small farmers had more cattle than 
large farmers.
The distribution of non-land production assets was skewed in favor of land-rich 
households (Table 5).  Power tillers and irrigation pumps were widely diffused among 






















Non-farm HHs 7 32.4 12 12 24 3.43 7 7 14 2.00 58.3
Farm HHs1)
0–0.99 23 46.5 56 52 108 4.70 25 32 57 2.48 52.8
1.00–1.99 24 46.6 65 53 118 4.92 35 41 76 3.17 64.4
2.00–2.99 8 53.4 17 19 36 4.50 13 13 26 3.25 72.2
3.00–3.99 6 54.8 14 16 30 5.00 10 12 22 3.67 73.3
4.00– 6 56.7 12 17 29 4.83 11 11 22 3.67 75.9
Unknown 1 59.0 4 3 7 7.00 3 3 6 6.00 85.7
Total 752) 47.6 180 172 352 4.69 104 119 223 2.97 63.4
Source: Survey by author in 2003.
Notes: 1) Farm size includes only lowland paddy fields.
2) The total number of households in June 2003 was 147.
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Non-farm HHs 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 28.6 1 14.3
Farm HHs1)
0–0.99 23 13.2 0.6 4.5 0.2 8.2 21.4 0.9 7 30.4 6 26.1
1.00–1.99 24 32.7 1.4 20.6 0.9 6.1 38.8 1.6 7 29.2 8 33.3
2.00–2.99 8 18.7 2.3 2.9 0.4 0.6 19.3 2.4 3 37.5 7 87.5
3.00–3.99 6 19.4 3.2 3.7 0.6 0.0 19.4 3.2 1 16.7 2 33.3
4.00– 6 40.5 6.8 9.0 1.5 0.0 40.5 6.8 2 33.3 1 16.7
Unknown 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 75 124.5 1.7 40.7 0.5 14.9 139.3 1.9 22 29.3 25 33.3
Source: Survey by author in 2003.
Note: 1) Lowland paddy fields only.
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Number Per HH Number
Per 
HH
Non-farm HHs 7 2 0 1 0.3 0 43 24 6.1 82 11.7 173 24.7 0 0
Farm HHs
0–0.99 23 28 19 31 2.0 0 10 18 0.4 291 12.7 327 14.2 0 0
1.00–1.99 24 69 17 24 3.6 14 41 24 1.7 160 6.7 358 14.9 7 0
2.00–2.99 8 2 6 5 1.0 0 7 14 0.9 95 11.9 250 31.3 0 0
3.00–3.99 6 0 8 6 1.3 0 12 24 2.0 97 16.2 98 16.3 0 2
4.00– 6 6 4 8 1.7 0 2 11 0.3 66 11.0 44 7.3 0 0
Unknown 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10.0 0 0
Total 75 107 54 75 2.1 14 115 115 1.5 791 10.5 1260 16.8 7 2
Source: Survey by author in 2003.













Non-farm HHs 7 0.29 0 0.29 0.14 0.29
Farm HHs
0–0.99 23 0.04 0.22 0.61 0.13 0.78
1.00–1.99 24 0.13 0.58 0.71 0.29 1.54
2.00–2.99 8 0.13 0.88 1.00 0.38 1.50
3.00–3.99 6 0 0.50 0.67 0.17 2.17
4.00– 6 0.17 0.83 1.17 0.33 1.33
Unknown 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 75 0.11 0.45 0.69 0.23 1.20
Source: Survey by author in 2003.














Non-farm HHs 7 1.86 1.14 0.71 0.86 0.57 0.29 0.29 0 0
Farm HHs
0–0.99 23 2.83 0.87 1.04 0.78 0.39 0.39 0.17 0.04 0
1.00–1.99 24 2.54 1.04 0.96 0.92 0.67 0.50 0 0.21 0
2.00–2.99 8 4.50 1.25 1.13 0.88 0.75 0.88 0.50 0.25 0.13
3.00–3.99 6 2.67 1.17 0.67 0.83 0.67 0.33 0.50 0.17 0
4.00– 6 4.50 1.17 0.50 1.17 0.83 0.67 0.67 0 0.33
Unknown 1 0 1.00 2.00 0 1.00 0 0 0 0
Total 75 2.91 1.04 0.93 0.87 0.60 0.48 0.23 0.12 0.04
Source: Survey by author in 2003.
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large farmers.  The distribution of consumer durables (Table 6), however, had no clear 
relationship with landholding size, except for the smallest farm size class (0–0.99 ha). 
One household had, on average, three electric fans, one TV set, one bicycle, one refrig-
erator, 0.6 CD players, and 0.5 motor bikes.  Sewing machines were diffused more widely 
among the land-poor households.
In sum, the study village had quite an egalitarian agrarian structure.  Although dis-
parity in the land holding size of paddy fields was quite large, it did not necessarily cor-
respond to each household’s economic status.
III Development and Impact of the Savings Group
III-1 Establishment and Development of the Savings Group
Under the guidance of CODI and LWU, an SG started with 87 members on September 27, 
2000.  Initially, CODI provided four million kip (approximately US$400) as seed money.8) 
Five village women were selected as committee members, and CODI provided them with 
four days of training.  As Don Neua belonged to khet no. 5,9) the SG was supervised by 
the chairman of that khet-level SG.10)
At the time of our July 2003 survey, the minimum amount of monthly savings was 
10,000 kip (approximately US$1).11)  Only female members could apply for a loan, with a 
ceiling of five times her savings amount at an interest rate of 4% per month.12)  The loan 
period was basically four months but could be extended to six months.  On the first day 
of each month, all the transactions were completed.  In the morning, the committee 
received three kinds of money: regular savings, interest payments, and principal repay-
ments.  In the afternoon, the committee disbursed new loans for the previously approved 
applications.
8) Two different institutions provided seed money.  The initially disbursed 2.5 million kip had to be 
repaid in installments within 25 years with no interest, but they did not have to repay the next 1.5 
million kip in a specific time, but they did have to pay interest of 1.5% per month.  When compared 
to the group’s accumulated savings (50 million kip in November 2002, 500 million kip in March 
2005), the size of the seed money was not significant.
9) Khet was an administrative unit in Laos between district and village, but it had been abolished before 
our first survey in 2003.  The management of the SGs, however, still utilized it.
10) Pakngum District is composed of six khet, and khet no. 5 contained eight villages, including Don 
Neua.
11) During the initial 10 months from October 2000 to July 2001, the minimum amount was 5,000 kip. 
Each SG could determine its regulations to a certain degree.
12) During the initial 10 months, the interest rate was 3% per month.  However, because of the strong 
demand for credit, the interest rate was raised to 4%.
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The net profit after deducting expenditures13) was distributed once a year (at the 
end of July in Don Neua) according to the following rule: 7% each to the reserves fund 
and the welfare fund, 12% for allowances to committee members, 2% for allowances to 
consultants (six men elected by the members),14) 2% to the khet-level SG chairman, 
and the remaining 70% to members as dividends.  Given the small amount of expendi-
tures, the dividend rate was slightly less than 2.8% per month (70% of 4% per month 
interest).  The dividend rate of 2.8% per month (33.6% per year) was much higher than 
the bank interest rates shown in Fig. 1, giving the villagers incentives to save more in 
the SG.15)
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the development locus of the SG.  As the tables report, 
the SG of the study village developed quite rapidly and smoothly.  First, the number of 
members, which began with 87, increased to 168 (from 92 households) in July 2003.  It 
jumped to 192 in August 200316) and further increased rapidly, exceeding 300 in Septem-
ber 2004 and 400 in July 2005.  Almost all the households participated in the SG.  Although 
the number of households and population of the village also increased, on average two to 
three members of each household became the members of the SG.
Second, the savings amount exhibited accelerated growth, partly because the aver-
age monthly savings per member increased.  They saved more than the minimum amount 
of 10,000 kip per month, whereas very few instances and only small amounts of with-
drawal from savings occurred.17)  The total amount of SG funds, therefore, increased 
rapidly despite the annual distribution of profit.18)  It exceeded 50 million kip in November 
2002, 100 million kip in June 2003, 200 million kip in March 2004, and 500 million kip in 
March 2005.19)
13) The major expenditure items included furniture, stationery, meeting expenses (primarily food), 
travel cost, and donations to temples/festivals.
14) The committee members and the consultants were selected by vote for a one-year term, although 
re-election was allowed.
15) If we consider the high inflation rates in Laos as stated in footnote 19, the real bank saving interest 
rates were chronically negative, which also contributed to the increased deposits to the SG.
16) It seems that our intervention by conducting the survey encouraged greater villager participation 
in the SG, although we did not promote it.
17) The committee members stated that they strongly encouraged members not to withdraw savings 
even when they need it, and encouraged them to borrow from the SG.
18) As Table 7 reveals, members usually deposited considerable savings in the month following dividend 
distribution.
19) As the Laos inflation rate decreased substantially after 2001 (19.1% in 1995, 19.2% in 1996, 19.5% 
in 1997, 90.1% in 1998, 128.4% in 1999, 23.3% in 2000, 7.8% in 2001, 10.7% in 2002, 15.5% in 2003, 
10.5% in 2004, 7.2% in 2005, 6.8% in 2006, 7.6% in 2008, 0.0% in 2009, 6.0% in 2010, 7.6% in 2011, 
and 5.1% in 2012), we can safely say that the amount of total funds of the SG increased sharply in 
real terms as well.
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Third, despite the relatively high lending interest rate (4% per month),20) members 
showed a strong demand for loans, leaving a very small amount of funds in the hands of 
the committee.  Under such a chronic excess demand for loans, the committee had to 
ration credit, granting priority to urgently needy members and members with small loan 
amount applications.  However, as the shortage of funds eased, the average loan size 
increased; it exceeded 0.5 million kip in March 2002 and 1 million kip in April 2003.
20) The real lending interest rates were also lower than 48% per annum if we consider the high inflation 
rates in Laos stated in footnote 19.
Fig. 1 Interest Rate Structure in Laos
Sources: Kip: Bank of the Lao.  http://www.bol.gov.la/english/interrate1.html (accessed Jan. 15, 2015)
Bhat: Bank of Thailand.  http://www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/FinancialMarkets/InterestRate/
Pages/StatInterestRate.aspx (accessed Jan. 15, 2015)
Note: 12 months interest rate
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2000 Oct 87 1,077 12.4 2 1,000 500 1,080 42
Nov 102 985 9.7 4 1,000 250 2,090 10
Dec 112 1,040 9.3 6 1,050 175 3,190 60
2001 Jan 118 1,147 9.7 7 2,000 286 4,430 105
Feb 121 1,405 11.6 8 2,000 250 5,500 27
Mar 129 1,206 9.3 7 2,300 329 6,850 27
Apr 133 1,143 8.6 12 3,450 288 8,190 7
May 137 1,435 10.5 12 3,800 317 9,850 0
Jun 137 1,250 9.1 10 3,600 360 11,250 92
Jul 131 1,455 11.1 15 5,100 340 12,850 98
Aug 137 1,360 9.9 14 6,100 436 14,570 102
Sep 125 1,885 15.1 26 6,300 242 205 14,590 200
Oct 128 1,305 10.2 9 1,700 189 16,140 157
Nov 128 1,310 10.2 11 4,600 418 17,770 183
Dec 135 1,428 10.6 20 8,800 440 19,680 0
2002 Jan 135 1,405 10.4 14 4,000 286 21,630 349
Feb 135 1,320 9.8 16 5,400 338 23,560 422
Mar 140 1,533 10.9 22 11,200 509 25,770 483
Apr 142 2,730 19.2 26 8,900 342 29,280 343
May 143 6,783 47.4 21 14,500 690 37,000 255
Jun 143 1,775 12.4 22 13,100 595 39,020 531
Jul 143 2,000 14.0 18 9,400 522 42,330 377
Aug 137 5,548 40.5 25 14,300 572 710 38,590 469
Sep 144 3,077 21.4 25 15,200 608 42,960 585
Oct 147 2,503 17.0 26 13,700 527 46,930 481
Nov 147 2,640 18.0 9 7,050 783 51,180 363
Dec 150 3,002 20.0 18 14,800 822 56,950 436
2003 Jan 151 3,296 21.8 27 22,100 819 62,100 676
Feb 153 3,552 23.2 32 18,300 572 67,820 58
Mar 155 4,880 31.5 17 16,300 959 75,130 310
Apr 154 3,426 22.2 24 23,500 979 81,260 180
May 161 4,612 28.6 28 31,000 1,107 88,800 814
Jun 162 10,625 65.6 28 29,825 1,065 102,630 1,202
Jul 168 5,175 30.8 16 16,700 1,044 2,731 78,570 6,340
Aug 192 25,559 133.1 25 31,300 1,252 104,130 2,699
Sep 200 9,618 48.1 38 45,250 1,191 117,550 211
Oct 206 6,308 30.6 30 33,890 1,130 128,450 535
Nov 206 6,083 29.5 18 24,400 1,356 138,450 2,739
Dec 207 7,447 36.0 9 6,060 673 151,040 12,267
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2004 Jan 210 13,461 64.1 17 33,650 1,979 131,910 1,720
Feb 212 13,832 65.2 35 38,000 1,086 145,740 14,620
Mar 216 60,653 280.8 53 82,760 1,562 206,390 5,940
Apr 219 15,000 68.5 34 32,360 952 221,390 7,770
May 219 27,570 125.9 8 11,580 1,448 248,960 36,670
Jun 222 8,670 39.1 19 42,280 2,225 255,160 36,520
Jul 222 8,440 38.0 18 16,300 906 263,600 73,340
Aug 281 75,730 269.5 271,160 8,689 294,080 38,110
Sep 317 49,640 156.6 85,590 342,710 15,530
Oct 322 19,960 62.0 21,360 354,460 33,870
Nov 328 62,280 189.9 64,260 414,750 68,530
Dec 13,800 60,520 428,550 55,910
2005 Jan 36,980 55,290 465,200 73,510
Feb 364 26,050 71.6 138,170 489,960 41,030
Mar 382 15,730 41.2 38,020 505,690 63,320
Apr 395 13,780 34.9 46,400 519,460 75,650
May 399 11,870 29.7 12,460 531,340 136,730
Jun 14,630 18,780 545,970 177,580
Jul 400 14,450 36.1 360 560,420 320,190





Aug 76,040 226,900 21,375 729,400 48,350
Sep 20,560 180,950 730,900 37,020
Oct 18,600 35,500 746,230 55,890
Nov 25,870 39,280 753,910 81,310
Dec 13,630 33,300 765,540 99,940
2008 Jan 649 21,400 33.0 32,470 780,090 107,880
Feb 13,110 162,900 790,400 35,100
Mar 11,280 8,850 779,000 53,880
Apr 10,660 44,780 787,520 90,710
May 11,040 4,340 796,940 141,500
Jun 9,870 51,460 805,610 147,610
Jul 6,410 106,740 759,950 379,840
Aug 115,350 2,900 25,101 751,380 143,930
Sep 33,500 119,690 779,480 84,110
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III-2 Village Financial Market and the SG
The financial market of the study village was rather simple before the advent of the SG. 
The only formal financial institution that villagers could use was the Agricultural Pro-
motion Bank (APB), and its local branch was located in Naxon village on national high-
way no. 13, roughly 22 km from the village.  Villagers’ other sources of credit were 
informal, including relatives and friends, traders, shopkeepers, and professional money-
lenders.
The APB Naxon local branch was established in 1996 with six officials, including 
one head of the branch, two accountants, one cashier, and two loan officers.  Table 9 
summarized the savings and loan amounts of the local branch as of March 2004.
As seen in Table 9, the amount of savings reached 728.0 million kip, comprising 
3.6 million kip of current accounts (0.5%), 333.9 million kip of savings accounts (45.9%), 
312.3 million kip of time deposits (42.9%),21) and 78.2 million kip of APB bonds (10.7%). 
The amount of loans reached 1,743.6 million kip, including 999.9 million kip of crop loans 
(57.3%), 116.3 million kip of business loans (6.7%),22) 274.0 million kip for livestock 
 raising (15.7%), and 322.5 million kip for farmland development (18.5%).  The amount 
of loans far exceeded savings mobilized by the local branch.  Note also that the term 
loans such as those for farmland development and farm equipment did not correspond 
with the terms of mobilized savings, because most of them were termed within one 
year.
APB provided crop loans through a group lending system under which farmers 
formed a group of 4–10 persons.  Such a new system facilitated quick disbursement of 
loans without collateral, although the amount of loan per borrower was rather limited. 
Loans other than crop loans provided directly to individuals were relatively larger, but 
21) The major periods of time deposit were three months and six months.
22) Business loans were disbursed mainly for working capital for trading activities.
Table 9 Savings and Credit of APB Naxon Local Branch
(1,000 kip)
Savings Loan
Current account 3,609 Crop loan 999,876
Savings account 333,885 Business loan 116,309
Time deposit 312,295 Livestock 273,960
APB bond 78,172 Handicraft 22,500
Farmland development 322,450
Farm machinery 8,500
Total 727,961 Total 1,743,595
Source: Interview with head of the local branch in March 2004.
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they entailed cumbersome formalities, including provision of collateral.23)  However, the 
APB Naxon local branch had non-performing loans (NPLs) totaling 58.5 million kip, 80.5% 
of which were crop loans.  According to the head of the local branch, this situation resulted 
largely from natural disasters such as flooding and pest infestations, especially in the 
monsoon season.  Therefore, it can be said that the group lending system functioned 
rather ineffectively for recovering loans.
In Don Neua, five groups had received APB crop loans as of March 2004.  Encour-
aged by APB officials, 11 farmers formed the first group in January 2001.  According to 
a farmer who joined a group created in April 2003, six farmers with 1–2 ha of paddy fields 
formed a group that borrowed crop loans twice a year for monsoon season and dry season 
rice cultivation.  The loan amount was 1.5 million kip for the monsoon season (six months) 
and 2 million kip for the dry season (five months), with an interest rate of 12% per annum.
Table 10 summarizes the borrowing status of the sampled households in July 2003. 
The sources of loans were categorized into informal credit, APB, and the SG.
The table reveals that 15 households (20%) borrowed from APB (12 households 
through the group lending system and the rest 3 households through the individual 
lending system), whereas 17 households (23%) borrowed from informal sources.  Note 
that non-farm households were excluded from APB loans and more than half of them 
borrowed from informal sources.  In contrast, 65% of the sampled households participated 
in the SG, and 69% of the member households borrowed from the SG.  The number of 
borrowers from the SG, 34, far exceeded the number of borrowers from APB and infor-
mal sources.  The loan size was the largest for APB individual loans (on average 7.7 
million kip), followed by SG loans (1.5 million kip), informal credit (1.4 million kip), and 
APB group loans (slightly less than 1 million kip).
Table 11 shows the interest rate structure of informal credit, which exhibited bi-
modal distribution; that is, interest-free and a high interest rate of 10% per month were 
most common.  Note that the APB loan interest rate was 1% (group lending) or slightly 
higher than 1% (individual lending) per month, whereas the SG charged 4% per month, 
as noted.  The interest rate of the SG was much higher than that of APB, but lower than 
that of informal credit.
Table 12 shows the purpose of SG loans, based on information obtained from the 
sampled households.  (Figures in Table 8 were based on the records of the SG committee.) 
23) According to a woman in the study village interviewed in March 2004, when she borrowed 5 million 
kip from APB for pig raising under an individual lending system, she had to submit three kinds of 
certificates (family certificate, address certificate, and collateral certificate), curriculum vitae, and 
six photos, in addition to paying a 120,000 kip processing fee.  After submitting all the necessary 
documents, she waited roughly two months until the disbursement of the loan.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The result was close to that of Table 8, but the household survey additionally revealed a 
positive correlation between larger loan amounts and production purposes, especially pig 
raising.  The strong demand for loan in the study village was basically for various produc-
tion purposes such as rice cultivation, livestock rearing, jees brewing, and trade.
According to several village informants, a major impact of the SG was the eradication 
of standing crop (paddy) sales, which were previously widespread.  The custom was that 
if farmers sold at the time of transplantation (about four months before harvesting), buy-
ers offered only half the expected price at harvest, and if they sold two months after 
transplanting, they received only 60–70% of the expected price.  It was reported that the 
major buyers were either villagers with a large amount of regular support from abroad 
(largely the USA) or village-level traders.  The effective rate of interest involved in these 
transactions was estimated as high as 20–25% per month.
Study results thus suggest that although the SG loan interest rate was much higher 
than APB’s, the SG provided villagers a much easier source of credit with reasonable 






0% 4% 5% 10%
<50 6 4 1 2
<100 6 1 1 3
<500 3 3
500– 2 1 1
Total 17 9 2 1 5
Source: Survey by author in 2003.












<500 8 2 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 1
<1,000 8 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0
<5,000 15 1 5 2 2 1 1 0 1 2
5,000– 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Total 34 7 5 3 6 4 3 1 2 3
% 100.0 20.6 14.7 8.8 17.6 11.8 8.8 2.9 5.9 8.8
Source: Survey by author in 2003.
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terms and conditions, and thereby contributed to production activities and poverty eradi-
cation.24)  Most importantly, the SG, unlike major microfinance institutions such as the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, mobilized villager savings and extended them to villagers 
who needed loans, filling local needs while generating interest income, and thus serving 
as an efficient intermediary between villagers with funds-excess and funds-deficit.
IV The Excess Funds Problem
Table 7 reported information on “carry-over cash” in the hands of the SG committee. 
Carry-over cash was almost nil (below 1–2% of total funds) until the end of 2003.  The 
demand for credit in the village was so strong that nearly all the funds (including the 
reserved funds and welfare funds) were extended as loans.  However, the carry-over cash 
began increasing in 2004, when more than 10% of total funds remained after extending 
loans.  Note that the SG opened an APB savings account in January 2001 but did not 
deposit the surplus money at APB.  Instead, they divided the money among the five 
committee members and retained it in each household.  The committee members report 
that only a very small amount of money was deposited in the bank account, primarily 
because the APB local branch was too far from the village.
If the excess funds become too large, the profit and member dividend decrease.  The 
major reason for villagers depositing money in the SG was the high dividend rate of 
slightly less than 2.8% per month.
The excess funds reached an intolerable level in 2005.  In June 2005, for instance, 
of the 546.0 million kip total funds, 177.6 million kip (32.5%) remained as surplus.  In this 
situation, even if all loans were extended at the interest rate of 4% per month, the rate 
of dividend becomes less than 1.9% per month, far lower than the former rate of 2.8%.25)
The SG committee responded to the new situation as follows.  First, they decided 
to reduce the monthly lending interest rate from 4% to 3%, by which they intended to 
increase the demand for credit while discouraging members from saving.  Second, to 
increase the demand for credit they decided that male members were also allowed to 
borrow from the SG.  Third, they tried to invest the surplus money in pig raising as a 
venture of the SG itself; however, because pork prices declined, they soon stopped after 
incurring a loss.  Finally, they decided to extend loans to non-members, especially per-
24) The other contribution of the SG was that its welfare fund gave financial assistance to villagers for 
funerals and for travel expenses for selected students.
25) Because bank savings interest rate was lowered to 5% per annum in 2005 (Fig. 1), even the SG 
decreased the dividend rate to 1.9% per month which was still much higher than the bank rate.
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sons living outside the village.
Soon after they implemented the final measure with large loan amounts, a serious 
problem arose.  Many of the outside borrowers did not repay the principal, although they 
continued to pay monthly interest.  According to the information I obtained when visiting 
the village in September 2008, a total 96 million kip of loans to 16 outside borrowers had 
become NPLs.  At that time, the total loans extended by the SG was slightly less than 
700 million kip (Table 7), with roughly 15% NPLs.  Because the committee members did 
not provide me with the detailed record of the SG, Table 7 lacks data from September 
2005 to June 2007.  When I discussed this issue with the head of the village (one of the 
SG consultants), he disclosed that even he did not know about the committee’s 2005 
decision to extend credit to outside borrowers and became aware of it only after it devel-
oped into a serious problem.
In February 2012 when I visited the village again, the situation had become much 
worse, although the details of events between the two periods were unknown.  At that 
time, the total amount of NPLs reached approximately 860 million kip, of which nine 
members accounted for 60 million and five outside borrowers for the remaining 800 mil-
lion.  The committee members stated that the problem of 60 million kip for nine members 
was relatively minor because the loans had only recently become NPLs when they failed 
to repay within six months from disbursement, although some of the members had inten-
tionally failed to repay.  However, they found the problem of 800 million for five outsiders 
very serious because it had occurred in 2005 and continued through 2012.  Worse yet, 
the five outside borrowers had stopped paying even monthly interest during the year 
prior to February 2012.26)
The committee members reported that the total funds in February 2012 were 1,289 
million kip, with NPLs at 66.7%!  If accurate, the financial situation posed a critical prob-
lem for the SG.  Since 2009, the committee members had been gathering two to three 
times a month to discuss this issue.
The committee also decided to reduce the lending interest rate further to 2% per 
month (from the former 3%) since the beginning of 2012.  At the time of the survey in 
February 2012, the total number of members was 847 (with 444 females), which exceeded 
26) The author could not determine how the 96 million kip NPLs in 2008 became 800 million kip in 
2012.  The NPL details in February 2012 were as follows.  Of the five outside borrowers, two bor-
rowers (one teacher with 17 million kip and one farmer with 91 million kip) had promised to com-
plete repayment within two months, as expected by the committee, with the help of the khet-level 
SG.  The farmer would repay the loan by selling his farmland.  (The prevailing land price in the area 
was 52 million kip per rai [=0.167 ha].)  Of the remaining three borrowers, two were farmers with 
a total of 400 million kip, and one was an owner of a construction company with 300 million kip. 
There was no clear repayment solution for them at that time.
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810, the total population of the village, because some emigrants from the village remained 
as members.  It was reported that of the total 160 households, all except 3 “poor” house-
holds participated in the SG.  After the lending interest rate reduction, the members of 
34 households (of 157 households) stopped providing monthly savings and also tried to 
withdraw their savings.
How had CODI (WECP)27) and LWU, both of which were responsible for supervising 
the SGs, reacted to such a serious situation in the study village?  My February 2012 
interview survey at the LWU Pakgnum District Office found that they became aware of 
the problem in Don Neua only in 2010.  They provided no clear plan of how to solve the 
problem.
According to the LWU Pakngum District Office, the excess funds problem in the 
district was as follows.  Only one SG other than Don Neua, extended loans to outside 
borrowers, and the other village had so far had no serious problem like Don Neua’s.  The 
excess funds problem occurred in several other villages as well (among the total 53 SGs 
in the district), but all the other villages, except for these two, attempted to solve the 
problem through an official system, that is, extending loans to other SGs through coor-
dination of the khet-level SG.  However, the LWU Pakngum District Office stated that 
although this system began in 2005, very few SGs had extended loans to other SGs.  Only 
three khet of the six in the district had experienced such transactions.
Our interview survey at the office of FIAM in 2007 found that it had introduced a 
system of transferring excess funds between SGs.  But it was found that the system 
neither ensured sufficient profits to SGs which provide excess funds nor did it provide 
funds at a low lending interest rate to SGs with funds-deficit, because the system took a 
high margin in the intermediaries between two SGs.28)29)  It seems that this institutional 
deficiency was the major reason for these systems’ unpopularity.
27) Women’s Empowerment in Communities Project (WECP) succeeded CODI in monitoring the SG.
28) According to a FIAM Thai officer (interviewed on August 31, 2007), FIAM established “Lao league 
of village banks” in July 2004 with 17 committee members and at the time of the interview 65 SGs 
were the member of the league.  The system is that SGs with excess funds can deposit to the league 
with an interest rate of 1.5% per month.  On the other hand, SGs that want to borrow from the 
league should pay 3% per month interest.  The profits are distributed to shareholders (25%), bonus 
for staff (10%), bonus for the committee (10%), “Education fund” (10%), “welfare” for the commit-
tee/staff (10%), reserved fund (27%), etc.
29) On the other hand, according to an officer of CODI (interviewed on September 3, 2007), CODI 
organized a bank at the district-level LWU and provided a fund of US$5,000 to each during 2002–05 
through the headquarter of the LWU.  The margin of 0.3% per month interest is taken by the 
headquarter whereas 1.2% margin is taken by the district LWU.  Finally, the village SG takes a 
margin of 0.5% so finally the interest rate paid by SG members becomes 2.0% per month.  In this 
case, the high intermediary margins seem to be a problem.
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In sum, results demonstrate that Don Neua might be an exceptional case where the 
excess funds problem developed into a very serious situation; however, the problem in 
Don Neua became so serious because the overall auditing system for the SGs was very 
weak and lacked a risk mitigation mechanism.  The core problem may lie in the failure 
to establish an appropriate system of transferring funds from SGs with funds-excess to 
those with funds-deficit or to broader, less risky external financial markets.  At the time 
of my February 2012 survey, six months had passed since CODI (WECP) withdrew 
from the SG program.  LWU could not establish a new monitoring system for the SGs.
V Concluding Remarks
Some of the SGs organized in Laos since 1997 have experienced great success in that 
they mobilized considerable savings in rural areas in a short period and extended the 
savings to members in need as loans with reasonable terms and conditions.  Such SGs 
contributed to the villages’ economic development and alleviated poverty by eradicating 
exploitative informal credit such as that on standing crop sales.  The most important point 
is that the SGs, unlike the major microfinance institutions such as the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, mobilized rural villagers’ savings and extended them to villagers who needed 
loans, and thereby have served as an efficient intermediary between villagers with funds 
excess and those with funds deficit.  Efficient, since they successfully reduced transaction 
costs for transferring funds between villagers within the same village boundary.  The SG 
in the study village had been one of the greatest successful cases.
However, that very success, because of its rapidity, created a trap.  Because of the 
high rate of return for savings (at slightly less than 2.8% per month in Don Neua), villag-
ers tried to make the largest possible deposits by increasing the number of members 
from the same family and by increasing their amount of monthly savings far beyond the 
minimum obligation.  Finally, the accumulated savings exceeded the demand for credit, 
and a substantial amount of carry-over cash remained in the committee members’ hands.
The basic problem lied in the system that the activity of the SG was confined to their 
village.  There was no demand for credit any more in the village.  The committee mem-
bers could not determine a solution for the issue, given the members’ high expectations 
for maintaining high rate of dividend.  They even began a pig-raising investment project 
to obtain profits, but that project failed because the price of pork fell.  They made their 
final decision to extend loans to entrepreneurs outside the village without consulting even 
the local SG consultants.  And they finally faced a serious problem of non- performing loans.
The success of the SG in the repayment of loans can be attributed to a kind of com-
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munity function at the village level.  As the villagers remain in the village or have close 
day-to-day relationships, even if they migrate to other areas, they feel obligated to avoid 
outright non-repayment of loans extended by their SG.  However, this control does not 
affect outsiders, as demonstrated by the Don Neua SG’s serious problem.  The commit-
tee members had too optimistic predictions of outside borrower behavior.
However, if SGs continue to confine their activity to their village, the falling rate of 
dividend will make villagers to stop savings after a certain point.  The most important 
task for the policy-makers in general, or the SG supervisory organizations (such as FIAM, 
CODI, and LWU) in particular, is to establish an efficient and reasonable system for 
transferring funds between SGs, and a system for transferring funds to external financial 
markets after the SG funds become excessive as a whole.
To date, Laos has experienced apparent failure in these core system elements.  The 
absence of these elements is the root cause of the Don Neua SG’s failure.  The experi-
ences of other countries, especially Japan, suggest a solution to the problem of excess 
funds, which several successful village-level SGs in Laos now face: treating the situation 
as an opportunity to form a broader, integrated financial market in the country, involving 
the vast rural areas.
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